















This paper traces developments from the inception of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord to its 
present form (Basel II). In highlighting the flaws of the 1988 Accord, an evaluation is made of 
the Basel Committee’s efforts to address such weaknesses through Basel II. Whilst 
considerable progress has been achieved, the paper concludes, based on one of the principal 
aims of these Accords, namely the management of risk, that more work is still required 



































Risk Management by the Basel Committee: Evaluating Progress made from 
the 1988 Basel Accord to Recent Developments 
 




The Role of Bank Supervisors in Maintaining Adequate Bank Capital 
 
The importance of risk management derives from the objectives of financial regulation. The problem 
of systemic risk constitutes part of the embodiment of the rationale for financial regulation.
2 
Regulators impose liquidity monitoring measures on banks to meet specified minimum levels of 
withdrawals. However, such measures are precautionary against short-term cash flow problems rather 
than a situation of panic outburst.
3 The level of confidence reposed in the public by the financial 
community is what sustains banks in modern times and this is strengthened by external checks which 




Prudential regulation however, is not the only way in which some regulators
5 take interest in the 
financial management of authorised firms – there is also the principle of ensuring that a firm operates 
with required minimum level of capital in order to reduce the consequences of failure.
6 As a result, the 
focus on the solvency and safety and soundness of financial institutions and minimum capital 
requirement are often regarded as synonymous.
7 
 
High profile failures such as those of Franklin National Bank, Banco Ambrosiano, BCCI, Barings and 
others have highlighted the need for effective consolidated supervision and close monitoring of 
activities on a transnational basis.
8 Barings focussed on multi functional banking since it was fraud in 
the securities division which led to the collapse of the bank as a whole. The concept of ‘lead 
regulation’ developed independently from ‘consolidated supervision’ to manage the regulatory chain 
which was in place to supervise multi-authorised groups of institutions across various business forms.
9 
It originated from the 1986 ‘Big Bang’ and the introduction of the Financial Services Act 1986 and the 
Banking Act 1987 for the purposes of prudential regulation of diversified financial groups.
10 The issue 
relating to Barings as well as highlighting the problems and gaps which existed with prudential 
banking supervision, poor regulation and supervision of multi function firms
11 also highlighted the 
misleading problem of relying on the capital adequacy ratio as the sole source of determining a 
financial institution's well-being. 
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Capital  Adequacy 
 
Capital adequacy constitutes one of the foundations of prudential supervision.
12 In most countries 
there are minimum capital requirements for the establishment of new banks and capital adequacy tests 
are a regular element in ongoing supervision.
13 In the consultative package “The New Basel Capital 
Accord” issued by the Basel Committee in January 2001, the Basel Committee proposed a capital 
adequacy framework based on three complementary pillars: minimum capital requirements, a 
supervisory review process and market discipline. Capital adequacy is a term used to describe the 
adequacy of a bank’s aggregate capital in relation to the risks which arise from its assets, its off 
balance sheet transactions, its dealing operations and all other risks associated with its business.
14 
The aim is for a bank to have enough capital in relation to its risks to absorb the highest foreseeable 
amount of loss and still give allowance in which to realise assets, raise new capital or arrange for 
disposition of its business.
15 
 
Statutory requirements govern the minimum amount of capital which a bank must have.
16 These have 
been established by UK and European legislation and from internationally agreed recommendations of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
17 In the UK, the Financial Services Authority (FSA)’s 
approach to the calculation of the capital base and the capital ratios and the assessment of capital 
adequacy are set out in chapters of the FSA’s Interim Prudential Sourcebook for Banks (IPRU 
(BANK))
18. This has been supplemented by the FSA’s policy statement “Individual Capital Ratios for 
Banks”. In due course this will be replaced by the Integrated Prudential Sourcebook.
19 In addition, at 
the international level, the Basel Committee has issued far-reaching proposals to refine and develop 
the current approach. 
 
  
According to the drafters of the Basel Core Principles, “Banking, by its nature, entails a wide array of 
risks. Banking supervisors need to understand these risks and be satisfied that banks are adequately 
measuring and managing them.”
20 The Core Principles attempt to address the main risks encountered 
by banks in Principle Six which states that banking supervisors should set prudent and appropriate 
minimum capital adequacy requirements for all banks.
21 Capital is very vital in its role as it contains 
risk in a banking firm, protects deposits and equalises competition amongst banks.
22 During the early 
1980s, increasing international competition and losses on loans resulted in concerns about decreased 
capital levels in international banks
23. This instigated consultations between the Basel Committees and 




However, these capital measurements were usually, but not always, determined by banking 
supervisors based on disclosed items in the balance sheet which had been apportioned according to 
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judgements concerning their underlying risks.
25 The complaints which resulted from this mode of 
calculation related not only to its arbitrary nature, but also to the fact that it did not discriminate 
adequately between risk profiles of specific banks or between risks within a single bank.
26 
Furthermore, some banks felt that they were at a competitive disadvantage as a result of the 
regulation.
27 The ensuing section discusses measures developed by the Basel Committee to address the 
flaws inherent in the 1988 Basel Capital Accord. These measures were developed with the 
consideration for the first time, of the calculation of regulatory capital partly based on the risk models 
and systems of the individual banks.
28 However, as the following section will also reveal, criticisms 
still emanate from the new framework (Basel II). 
 
 




The problem with the Basel Accord was that it rewarded risky lending since it required banks to set 
aside the same amount of capital against loans to shaky borrowers as against those with better 
credits.
30 Apart from the fact that capital requirements were just reasonably related to a bank’s risk 
taking, the credit exposure requirement was the same regardless of the credit rating of the borrower.
31 
Furthermore, the capital requirement for credit exposure often depended on the exposure’s legal form 
– for instance, an on-balance sheet loan was generally subject to a higher capital requirement than that 
of an off-balance sheet  to the same borrower, even though such differentiation could be insignificant 
owing to financial engineering.
32 The subjectivity revolving round such requirements provided 
loopholes whereby banks could manipulate decisions in such a way as to attain the minimal level of 
capital requirement – without justification for a corresponding level of risk-related activities being 
undertaken by the banks. As well as insensitivity to risk – attributing from the fact that Basel I was not 
responsive and did not adapt easily to new banking activities and risk management techniques, another 
problem which resulted from Basel I was the reluctance of banks to invest in better risk management 
systems.
33 Given this insensitivity to risk, it is not only difficult to see how regulators are able to gauge 
accurately the level of risk inherent in activities undertaken by the bank, it would also complicate the 




In January 2001, the Basel Committee published revised and updated drafts of its earlier proposals in 
June 1999 to reform the 1988 Basel Capital Accord. A revised framework known as Basel II consists 
of three pillars namely: capital adequacy requirements, centralized supervision and market discipline 
and these pillars constitute the basis of the reform of the Basel Accord.
34 As well as linking capital to 
credit ratings by agencies such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's, banks' internal credit-ratings are 
also to be used as determinants of how much capital they should set aside.
35  Basel II aims to improve 
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measures of capital adequacy (Pillar 1), promote greater risk management practices whereby banks are 
required to continually assess internal risks relative to capital (through Pillar 2)particularly with 
regards to credit risk. The reforms also aim to develop the Accord into a more universal framework for 
use by national banking supervisors. 
 
On the 15
th November 2005, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued an updated version 
of Basel II (updated version of the International Convergence of Capital Measurements and Capital 
Standards: A Revised Framework) and also an updated version of the Capital Accord to incorporate 
market risks.
36 A “post-Enron” directive had been passed in 2002.
37 The directive aims towards a more 
effective oversight of financial groups which combine banking, insurance and other activities which 
had not been adequately covered and accounted for by the EU regulation in operation at that time.
38 As 
well as its main aim being the reduction of risk, it aims to ensure adequate capitalisation of financial 
conglomerates by banning practices which inflate a firm's capital base.
39 The deadline for 




Pillar One is based on more risk-sensitive capital requirements. While the definition of capital and the 
minimum capital coefficient of 8% are to remain unchanged, the existing risk categories of credit risk 
and market risk have been supplemented by a third risk category, namely, operational risk.
41 This will 
have to be corroborated by capital. 
In response to the deficiency of Basel 1, and given the fact that the measurement of minimum capital 
requirements is based on a general assessment of risk dispersion in the banking sector which does not 
correspond in every case to the specific circumstances of individual institutions, credit institutions will 
be required to retain more capital than that stipulated for the minimum capital requirements if their 
individual risk situation so demands.
42  
In addition to adapting to market developments, the revision of regulatory capital also aims to consider 
risk differentiation at the individual banks.
43 Standard and advanced risk measurement methods should 
provide banks with an incentive to continuously refine their internal risk management methodologies 
within the various risk categories.
44 
 
Pillar Two namely supervisory review, consists of four principles.
45 Principle 1 states that banks 
should have a means of determining their overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile and 
also a plan for sustaining their capital levels and that these processes require board and senior 
management oversight, sound capital assessment, a comprehensive risk management system, 
monitoring and review, internal control review. Principle 2 states that supervisors should review and 
evaluate banks' internal capital adequacy determinants and plans and also their ability to monitor and 
ensure compliance with regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors should also take necessary supervisory 
action if they are not satisfied with the outcome of this process.  Pillar Two could also include the 
combination of on-site examinations or inspections; off-site review; discussions with bank 
management and review of external auditors' work (as long as it sufficiently focusses on necessary 
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capital matters) and periodic reporting.
46 Principle 3 states that supervisors should require banks to 
operate above the minimum regulatory capital ratio and also that banks hold capital in excess of the 
minimum. Principle 4 states that supervisors should act at an early stage to prevent capital from falling 
below stipulated minimum levels. 
 
Risk cycles are usually pro-cyclical due to misperception by banks and markets about how risks move 
over the period.
47 There has been worry that the new Basel Accord on banks' capital standards could 
worsen this misperception by banks and markets – danger being that from 2006, banks would have to 
adjust their minimum capital requirements over time to align with changes in measured risk.
48 As a 
result, banks' internal risk assessment would vary more than it should over the course of the cycle.
49  
 
Other criticisms directed towards Basel 2 include supervisory discretion – that this could result to 
regulatory capture, that it is excessively risk sensitive, that its capital formula is too prescriptive and 
complex and that it is not well-suited for 90% of the world's population.
50  
 
Pillar 2 of the New Basel Accord ( Basel 2) however recognises the vital role played by supervisors in 
the maintenance of adequate bank capitalisation
51.With differences in legal and regulatory structures in 
different jurisdictions, the Basel Committee is conscious of the need to maintain adequate flexibility in 
the application of Pillar 2 in different jurisdictions.
52 The Committee’s intention in creating Pillar 2 
was to promote and support a more thorough process aimed at internationally active banks to 
determine the actual capital held and to make this process subject to a more focused supervisory 
review than may have been the case.
53 Pillar 2, both in its first principle and in the consideration of 
several more specific risks, makes it clear that the prime responsibility is on banks to make this 
determination, taking account of their circumstances.
54 While there are linkages between Pillar 1 and 
2, the Committee sees clear differences between the two.
55 Pillar 1 represents the minimum regulatory 
requirement whereas Pillar 2 expressly recognises that banks face risks not included under Pillar 1 
(such as interest rate risks in the banking book and uncertainties in measuring operational risks)
56 and 




Pillar 2 therefore expresses the Committee’s intention that internationally active banks should operate 
above the Pillar 1 minimum.
58 This principle plays a vital role in the overall Capital Accord, and Pillar 
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55See 'Continued progress towards Basel II : Current sense of the Committee on the implementation of the 
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The transparency requirements (Pillar 3) are not only designed to facilitate a complementary use of 
market mechanisms for prudential purposes but also bolster the minimum capital requirements (Pillar 
1) and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2).
60 This derives from the assumption that well informed 
market participants will reward a risk-conscious management strategy and effective risk control by 
credit institutions in their investment and credit decisions and will correspondingly penalise riskier 
behaviour.




Having discussed the regulatory flaws in the Basel 1988 Accord, namely the fact that it was not risk-
sensitive and the efforts of the Basel Committee in recognizing the calculation of regulatory capital 
which is premised partly on the risk models and systems of the individual banks, a shift from a wide 
command-and-control style of bank supervision to one whereby banks are still required to regulate 
capital, albeit according to their own models can be illustrated. 
 
 
Meta – Risk Regulation 
 
Regulation is often perceived as consisting of command and control strategies whereby the regulator 
imposes detailed rules with which the regulator monitors compliance.
63 However, this type of 
regulatory strategy draws firms into regulatory processes and attempts to both influence and make use 
of firms internal risk management and control strategies
64 As a result, supervision is not so much about 
the simple monitoring of firms' compliance with regulatory rules but more about evaluating and 
monitoring firms' awareness of the risks created by their business and of their internal controls.
65 
 
Meta risk regulation is about the risk management of internal risk and being able to use the firms' own 
internal risk management systems to achieve regulatory objectives.
66 The Basel II Capital Accord 
provides an example of the operation of meta regulation in that bank capitalisation is not to be 
imposed externally by regulators but will be determined by a bank's own internal risk management 
models provided these models are considered by regulators to be adequate.
67 One major advantage of 
meta-risk regulation is that whilst Basel II builds in a second pillar of a supervisory review process 
which requires regulators to ensure the soundness of banks' internal risk rating processes, it has been 
suggested that there is scope for bank “gaming and manipulation” of ratings as regulators at best, have 
information that is not as much as that of banks whilst banks have access to private risk-relevant 
information that can be excluded from the rating system presented to regulators.
68  
 
Most Recent Initiatives 
 
On the 21
st February 2008, a paper “Liquidity Risk: Management and Supervisory Challenges”, was 
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).
69 Responding to the market turmoil 
which commenced in mid-2007, the Committee’s Working Group made observations on the strengths 
and weaknesses of liquidity risk management whenever confronted with crisis.
70 
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On the 11
th April 2008, the report delivered by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), highlighted five 
recommendations for enhancing the resilience of markets and financial institutions.
71 The five points 
include: strengthening prudential oversight of capital liquidity and risk management, improving 
transparency and valuation procedures, implementing changes to the role and uses of credit ratings; 





th April 2008, the Basel Committee unveiled some procedures which are aimed at making the 
banking system more resilient to shocks, namely:
73 The enhancement of different aspects of Basel II 
whilst at the same time observing the need for timely implementation of the Basel II framework; the 
consolidation of global sound practice standards for managing liquidity risk; stimulating efforts to 
strengthen banks’ risk management and supervisory practices and; improving market discipline 
through better disclosure and valuation procedures.   
 
As Basel II is just being implemented in most Basel Committee member countries, the importance of 
its implementation, since it reflects the types of risks banks are confronted with in an ever increasing 
market oriented intermediation process, has been emphasised.
74 Furthermore, some measures aimed at 
helping to ensure sufficient capital, incorporate off-balance sheet exposures more effectively and 
improve regulatory capital incentives will be introduced by the BCBS.
75 
 
The BCBS aims to issue for consultation, in July 2008, global sound practice standards for the 






The Basel Committee has come a long way from the days of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord (BCBS, 
1988) which not only established minimum capital requirements for internationally active banks and 
was able to increase capital levels during this period, but was actually also the first international 
accord of such.
77 Having dedicated more focus to the first and second pillars of Basel II, with the third 
receiving the least attention, could Basel II be criticised for not having accorded more attention to 
Pillar 3? 
 




One of the main purposes of Basel I and Basel II is namely, the incorporation of risks. As a starting 
point, it needs to be stated that risks cannot be eliminated – they can only be minimised. If risks were 
eliminated, then regulation would serve no purpose. Concerns remain over hedge funds as this is an 
area where regulators have limited jurisdiction. Many regulators do not authorise such funds and most 
of the administrators of these hedge funds are located offshore.
78 In March 2008, the Financial 
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The risks identified by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in relation to hedge funds can be summarised 
as follows: Serious market disruption and erosion of confidence as a result of the failure or significant 
distress of a large and highly exposed hedge fund or, with greater probability, a cluster of medium sized 
hedge funds with significant and concentrated exposures; Liquidity disruption leading to disorderly markets 
as hedge funds make increasingly illiquid investments in particular markets and instruments whilst offering   9
Stability Forum (FSF) during its 19
th meeting, considered efforts by the hedge fund industry to review 
and improve sound practices – particularly those of the UK-based Hedge Fund Working Group and the 
US-based Asset Managers’ Committee and Investors’ Committee with the aim of increasing 




Non bank financial institutions 
 
Even though banks are unique in the sense of the extent of systemic risk they generate, such risks 
could also be triggered by a non bank financial institution. This could be illustrated by the effects of 
Enron’s collapse on the financial markets. It could then be argued that the disclosure of risk to market 
participants under Pillar 3 is not on its own sufficient, and that there is need for greater efforts to 
incorporate and disclose those risks attributed to non-bank institutions.  
                                                                                                                                                         
their investors the ability to withdraw their money more quickly.  
This could result in a significant liquidity mismatch and require hedge fund managers to dispose of assets 
very quickly, causing volatile and  potentially disorderly markets; insufficient reliable and comparable data is 
available to regulators which limits their ability to make informed decisions about risk and take proportionate 
regulatory action to mitigate such risk; Control issues arise as the trading (rather than management) 
background of many hedge fund managers, and their typical ownership structures, means that some managers 
do not have the right skills or incentives to create an effective control infrastructure. See 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/media/notes/bn008.shtml > 
 
79   B Gadanecz ‘Recent Initiatives by the Basel-based Committees and Groups’ pg 87 